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Summary  
 
This thesis primarily concerns the European Union (EU) value added tax (VAT) 
exemption for insurance transactions. Due to the negative consequences that exemptions 
have on the proper functioning of the VAT system and those subject to it, this thesis 
explores the possibility of adopting the Kiwi taxed approach for insurance transactions. 
In order to do this, the provisions and functioning of both the EU exemption and the 
Kiwi taxed system are analysed and compared. A discussion of how the Kiwi taxed 
system could alleviate the problems associated with the exemption is presented, 
alongside any complications and problems that are currently incorporated in the Kiwi 
system itself. In addition to the legal issues, practical difficulties that could arise in 
reality are also presented, as these are very relevant for a discussion on implementing a 
system change.  
 
A conclusion is reached whereby the Kiwi system is put forward as a preferential model 
to be used in the EU, as it alleviates many of the core problems associated with the EU 
exemption. However, it is submitted that the Kiwi system should not be blindly 
followed and replicated in its entirety, but rather that the EU should take the opportunity 
to advance a taxed system which learns from and overcomes the problems of the Kiwi 
system.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The European Union (EU) Value Added Tax (VAT) exemption for insurance 
transactions, laid down in Art 135(1)(a) of the current VAT Directive1, is well known 
for being fraught with associated negative consequences. As an exception to the general 
system of VAT, it easily attracts criticism for not being in line with the true nature of 
the tax, with little scope for justification for having such exceptional treatment. As it has 
been noted by the Commission, the decision of the Council in 1977 to exempt financial 
services and insurance was ‘mainly for pragmatic reasons since the technical difficulties 
could not be readily overcome’2, the principal one being the ‘difficulty of determining 
the value that is added in an insurance transaction.’3 Such an exemption can only hold 
its ground if this justification is viable, especially in the light of the ‘legal and economic 
collateral costs’4 that plague the current exemption system. 
 
Elsewhere, such as in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Israel and Argentina, 
insurance transactions are subject to some kind of value added tax, making it easy to 
contemplate the application of a taxed system in the EU. This thesis will make reference 
to the highly respected New Zealand (Kiwi) Goods and Services Tax (GST) system 
which was regarded by the Tax Review 2001 as ‘setting an international benchmark for 
expenditure taxes’5 and as a ‘broad-based, low rate, fair and efficient tax.’6 The Kiwi 
GST therefore makes a perfect point of reference when referring to applying a tax to 
insurance transactions and will explore whether it is both possible and preferable, from 
the viewpoint of the character of VAT and associated effects, to apply this system as an 
alternative to the current exemption.    
 
1.2 Purpose  
 
The aim of this thesis is to reach a conclusion about whether the EU should adopt the 
Kiwi approach for taxing insurance transactions, from the perspective of the true 
character of EU VAT and the legal and practical ramifications of doing so. The purpose 
of reaching such a conclusion is to examine a possible way to alleviate, or indeed 
minimise, the current problems that arise directly as a result of the current exemption.  
 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, OJ L 
347/1, 11/12/2006 (Council Directive 2006/112/EC) 
2 European Commission, Consultation Paper on Modernising Value Added Tax Obligations for Financial 
Services and Insurances (DG Taxation and Customs Union Brussels, 2006) 2 
3 Thomas G. Thornbury, ‘A Better Way To Include General Insurance in VAT Systems’ (1991) 
International VAT Monitor May (5), 2. See also Report of the Joint Committee on Taxation (U.S.A.), 
reported in Bureau of National Affairs Daily Executive Report, May 15, 1989,  L-14 
4 Rita de la Feria and Richard Krever ‘Ending VAT Exemptions: Towards a Post-Modern VAT’, in Rita 
de la Feria, VAT Exemptions: Consequences and Design Alternatives (EUCOTAX Series on European 
Taxation, Vol 3, Wolters Kluwer 2013) 25  
5 New Zealand Treasury, Tax Review 2001: Final Report, i 
6 Ibid 
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1. 3 Method and material  
 
In order to fulfil the aim of this thesis, the problems associated with exemptions in 
general, and in relation to the insurance exemption, will be explored. The provisions of 
the VAT Directive, alongside the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, will then be 
used to determine how the EU exemption really functions in practice. The method used 
for examining whether the adaptation of the Kiwi system would be beneficial will be to 
apply the Kiwi system to the EU functioning analysis and examine the effects and 
outcome. 
 
Alongside this, the main indicators for whether the use of the Kiwi system would be 
beneficial in the EU will be the impact the system is likely to have on the current 
problems associated with the exemption. In reaching a conclusion, the key negative 
consequences of the exemption will be assessed in the light of the Kiwi taxed system, to 
see to what extent they are alleviated, if at all. Similarly, the negative aspects of the 
Kiwi system will be examined to see how these would affect the application of the 
system in the EU. These assessments will play a vital role in reaching an overall 
conclusion regarding the positive applicability of the Kiwi system to the EU. Of course, 
other factors such as practicability will also be taken into account and must not be 
overlooked.  
 
1.4 Delimitation  
 
As it is almost universally accepted that it is not preferable to tax life insurance, with the 
vast majority of countries exempting such insurance and the rest subjecting it to 
extremely low rates, the discussions in this thesis will be limited to general damage 
based insurance transactions. This is supported by New Zealand’s approach of treating 
life insurance as an exempt financial service7, rendering comparisons between the 
systems futile in terms of seeking a better alternative approach. In terms of risk 
materialisation, this thesis will assume that the insured is not required to pay any excess 
or deductible when making an insurance claim, with the payments analysed being 
limited to the premium received and the indemnity payment made by the insurance 
company.  
 
The focus of this thesis will be placed not on the balance sheets of the insurance firms 
themselves8, nor the tax revenues of Member States, but on how the insurance 
exemption in the EU really functions and the effects of imposing a tax on such 
transactions. There has been a previous proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to insurance 
services in the EU9, which particularly focused on the financial impact of applying the 
Kiwi system, but which left open many of the necessary legal questions relating to the 
application. In the light of this, this thesis will largely evaluate the unanswered legal 
issues that exist in relation to how the systems function in practice, with less focus on 
                                                 
7 New Zealand Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, Public Act 1985 No 141, Date of assent and 
commencement 3 December 1985 (Reprint as at 1 April 2014)  (GST Act) s3(1)(h) and  (i) 
8 As this has been adequately covered by Sijbren Cnossen, ‘A proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to 
insurance services in the European Union’ (2013) Int Tax Public Finance 20, 867  
9 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘A proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to insurance services in the European Union’ 
(2013) Int Tax Public Finance 20, 867  
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the effect on the financial positions of the insurance firms, as this has been adequately 
covered.  
 
1.5 Outline  
 
The following chapter will discuss the problems associated with exemption systems in 
general, with a particular focus on those related to non-deductible input VAT incurred 
by exempt insurance firms. Chapter 3 will move on to discuss how the EU exemption 
for insurance transactions really functions in practice, and will include several case 
based examples to demonstrate this. In the light of the negative consequences of 
exemptions, Chapter 4 examines a contrasting approach for taxing insurance 
transactions which is currently applied in New Zealand. In an attempt to discover 
possible solutions for the problems relating to the EU exemption, Chapter 5 will analyse 
whether it would be possible, and more importantly, if it would be beneficial, to apply 
the Kiwi system to the EU. Finally, the thesis will reach a conclusion about the overall 
applicability of the Kiwi system and whether its adoption is recommended.  
2. Problems associated with VAT exemptions  
 
The application of an exemption to a particular supply means that output VAT is not 
chargeable, but consequently, input VAT is also not recoverable. Such a treatment has 
been rightly described as ‘an aberration in terms of the basic logic of VAT.’10 The 
Preambles to the VAT Directives, from the First Council Directive in 196711, to the 
current VAT Directive12, state that the objectives of the internal market presuppose 
turnover tax legislation which does ‘not distort conditions of competition or hinder the 
free movement of goods and services’13. Furthermore, the Preambles go on to state that 
a VAT system ‘achieves the highest degree of simplicity and of neutrality when the tax 
is levied in as general a manner as possible and when its scope covers all stages of 
production and distribution’.14 It is submitted that the application of exemptions fly in 
the face of these objectives.  
 
Exemptions exist as exceptions to the general system of VAT, so much so that they 
have been described by the Commission as ‘alien to the VAT system’15. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that these ‘alien’ exemptions do not live alongside the taxed VAT 
system harmoniously. Exemptions are well known for causing economic distortions 
within the VAT system and a critical example of this is the harmful effects of non-
deductible input VAT, which exist as a result of this mandatory insurance exemption, 
and which this chapter will reflect upon. Such a denial of input tax credit has been 
                                                 
10 Liam Ebrill and others, The Modern VAT (IMF 200) 83 
11 Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States 
concerning turnover taxes, OJ 71, 14/4/1967, p. 1301 (Council Directive 67/227/EEC) 
12 Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
13 Ibid, Preambles,  point (4)  
14 Ibid, Preambles, point (5)  
15 European Commission, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document: Proposal for a Council 
Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, as regards the 
treatment of insurance and financial services, COM/2007/747, 28 November 2008, SEC (2007) 1554 
(Impact Assessment accompanying COM/2007/747) 
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branded the ‘original sin’16 of the common system of VAT. The problems associated 
with exemptions are not specific to insurance transactions, but are widespread wherever 
an exemption occurs, due to the nature of the system.  
 
When introduced in the Sixth Council Directive in 197717, the current Article 135 
exemptions18 (then Art 13B) were intended merely as  a transient solution, however 
they have now become very much a permanent fixture of the VAT Directive, with little 
optimism remaining that the current proposals for reform will be effected, nor 
successful.19 Given that there have been no changes to the insurance exemption since its 
introduction, it is often criticised for not being up to date and failing to give guidance on 
more recent areas of the insurance sector as it has evolved. The result of this, combined 
with the option for Member States to introduce tax on insurance contracts20, has been 
that the exemption is not applied uniformly in all Member States and that there is a 
drastic lack of neutrality in the taxation of the insurance sector. 
 
2.1 Accumulation and under/over taxation depending on the status of 
the final consumer 
 
Before the modern VAT system was introduced, one of the main criticisms of the 
previous systems was accumulation, which was one of the key issues the modern 
system was introduced to tackle. However, the current system of exemptions 
encompasses the failures of the previous systems in this respect, by allowing the 
problem of accumulation to continue in the current VAT system. The critical problem 
with exemptions in relation to accumulation is that they ‘distort economic choices’21 in 
several ways, which directly goes against the objectives discussed previously from the 
Preambles.  
 
Accumulation occurs when exempt firms acquire goods/services from non-exempt 
wholesalers or when they outsource services. The VAT accumulates, resulting in 
disparities in the total VAT levied, depending on who the final consumer is. If the final-
consumer is a non-taxable person, the result is under-taxation when they acquire 
goods/services from an exempt supplier, rather than one that is subject to the normal 
system of VAT. However, if the purchaser of the exempt goods/services is a taxable 
person with the right to deduct, the impact of the accumulation results in over-taxation 
of the goods/services from the exempt supplier (such as an insurance firm), making it 
cheaper for them to acquire goods/services from a supplier that is subject to VAT. It is 
                                                 
16 Case 498/03 Kingscrest Associates and Montecello, Opinion of AG Colomer, para 14 
17 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, OJ L 
145, 13/06/1977, p. 1 (Council Directive 77/388/EEC, or Sixth Directive) 
18 Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
19 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value 
added tax, as regards the treatment of insurance and financial services COM/2007/747 final (28 
November 2007) (COM/2007/747). Supported by: Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down 
implementing measures for Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of 
value added tax, as regards the treatment of insurance and financial services, COM/2007/746 final (28 
November 2007) (COM/2007/746) 
20 Council Directive 2006/112/EC, Article 401 
21 Oskar Henkow, Financial Activities in European VAT (Kluwer Law International 2008)  4 
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undoubtedly true that this ‘hidden tax’22 on business clients ‘distorts the principle of 
fiscal neutrality on which the VAT system is based.’23  
 
2.2 Damaging international competitiveness of insurance firms 
Input VAT doesn’t cause issues for most companies supplying goods or services as they 
are able to deduct it from their outputs. For insurance firms, however, and indeed any 
firms supplying goods or services that are exempt, this VAT is irrecoverable as the 
exempt activities don’t give rise to the right to deduct. There are two possible impacts 
of this; the non deductible VAT, as a cost to the insurance firms, may go on to form part 
of the premiums charged, thereby raising the cost of taking out insurance cover. 
Alternatively, due to the competitive nature of the industry, firms supplying exempt 
services may have to bear the burden of these costs themselves, so that they can 
compete internationally. This is in contrast to non-EU based firms who do not have to 
bear input VAT and therefore don’t have this additional cost component to take into 
account in pricing considerations for premiums.  
This cost component that arises as a result of being subject to input VAT in the EU is 
also liable to make firms consider relocating outside of the EU, to make use of 
‘significant price advantages for financial institutions with headquarters outside of the 
European Union.’24 Alternatively, exempt suppliers may choose to locate in Member 
States with the lowest VAT rates, such as Luxembourg. Such relocations based on tax 
motives caused by exemptions distort competition within the EU and can adversely 
affect tax revenues of Member States. This is an important consideration as although it 
easy to contrast the position of EU and non-EU firms, due to diverging VAT rates 
within the EU, there are likely to be competition issues between EU firms that are 
subject to differing VAT rates on their inputs. The impact has been described as 
potentially bringing significant comparative advantages to financial service providers 
from MS with lower VAT rates.25  
As provided for by Article 169(c) of the VAT Directive, there is an additional scope of 
right of deduction for exempt insurance transactions where the customer is established 
outside the Community or where the transaction relates to goods to be exported out of 
the Community. Because of this provision, the competitive disadvantage is alleviated in 
terms of supplying to non-EU customers as the right of deduction puts EU firms on the 
same footing as non-EU firms that aren’t subject to VAT, however, the key problem in 
relation to EU customers remains, as they can otherwise get insurance cover from non-
EU firms without any input VAT included.  
                                                 
22 B Carvalho, M Lamensch and S Thiel, ‘VAT Exemption for Insurance-Related Services of Brokers and 
Agents: The Case of the “Call Centre”’ (2011) European Taxation, Vol 51, No 1, 19 
23 Ibid 
24 Ivana Drazic Lutilsky, Sanja Broz Tominac, Martina Dragija, ‘Financial Services in the VAT System in 
the European Union and Croatia’ (2012) South East European Journal of Economics & Business, 
November 2012, 23 at 29 
25 Ibid at 28. See also PricewaterhouseCoopers, Study to Increase the Understanding of the Economic 
Effects of the VAT Exemption for Financial and Insurance Services (2006)  
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2.3 Vertical integration of the supply chain and preventing efficient 
structuring and division of tasks  
The problem of accumulation also occurs if exempt insurance or financial firms are 
required to pay VAT on the services that they outsource to others. Given that this 
hidden tax can either be passed on to customers due to upward pressure on the costs, or 
has to be borne by the firm itself, the result is that due to international competition with 
firms that don’t incur non-deductible VAT, firms often have to absorb this cost 
themselves. The result of this is that the ‘exemption creates incentives for the avoidance 
of tax’26, so in contrast to efficient business structuring, vertical integration of the 
supply chain will occur, whereby firms will source the goods/services they require 
internally, often referred to as ‘self-supply’. Once again, exemptions are distorting 
economic choices as the ‘non-deductible VAT reduces the economic and financial 
advantages of outsourcing.’27  
Due to the hidden tax incorporated in outsourced goods/services, firms are ‘stimulated 
to choose sub-optimal business models’28 , incentivised by the avoidance of tax. The 
application of an exemption results in a VAT that is not neutral in terms of production, 
which of course, firms will try to use in a manner that results most favourably for them. 
The choice to self-supply is therefore biased, particularly in relation to labour intensive 
services. This results in business models that are inefficient economically. For instance, 
firms may choose to hire extra staff to carry out particular tasks that could be more 
efficiently carried out by external suppliers who are more specialised and experienced in 
the field and who can make use of economies of scale within that field. Furthermore, the 
exempt industry (such as insurance) is distorted in terms of the competitiveness of 
various firms. The tax bias in favour of self-supply puts smaller firms at a competitive 
disadvantage as they do not have the same capabilities for self-supply as larger firms do. 
Larger firms may therefore unfairly prosper, resulting in market domination of a few 
relatively larger firms and reduced choice for those seeking exempt services such as 
insurance.  
Although the effect on Member States tax revenues is outside the scope of this thesis, it 
is interesting to note that they too are affected by the non deductible VAT depending on 
whether they are net exporters or recipients of exempted services. As Terra has noted, 
net recipients will suffer a ‘drain on their receipts’29, with the unevenness becoming 
more accentuated as the Pan-European market deepens30.   
 
 
                                                 
26 Liam Ebrill and others, The Modern VAT (IMF 200) 86 
27 Joep Swinkels, ‘EU VAT Exemption for Insurance Transactions’ (2007) International VAT Monitor, 
July/August 2007, 262 
28 Ivana Drazic Lutilsky, Sanja Broz Tominac, Martina Dragija, ‘Financial Services in the VAT System in 
the European Union and Croatia’ (2012) South East European Journal of Economics & Business. See also 
Impact Assessment accompanying COM/2007/747  
29 Terra and Kajus, Introduction to European VAT (Recast) (IBFD, 2013) 704 
30 Ibid 
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3. The EU VAT exemption for insurance   
 
3.1 Background and provisions  
 
The VAT exemption for insurance transactions has been in place since 1977, when the 
Sixth VAT Directive was introduced31. The current VAT Directive retains the 
exemption in its original form under Art 135(1)(a)32, whereby Member States are 
obliged to exempt ‘insurance and reinsurance transactions, including related services 
performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents.’ The insurance exemption forms 
one segment of Article 135, which includes exemptions for ‘other activities’, in contrast 
to those ‘in the public interest’, which are included in Article 132. Unlike these other 
exemptions, the Directive doesn’t give any guidance as to the purpose of the Article 135 
exemptions, which are otherwise generally financial in nature, although is often put 
down as being due to the ‘technical complexity inherent in taxing financial services’33.  
 
In relation to insurance specifically, it was noted earlier that this technical complexity 
arises out of the need to calculate the value added in each transaction, in order to subject 
the transaction to VAT. According to De la Feria, it is widely accepted that in relation 
to insurance, the main service provided to policyholders is ‘financial intermediation 
through risk pooling…however, the difficulty is to determine the price of this 
intermediation.’34 Such difficulty arises because the invoice-credit method that is used 
to apply EU VAT only works well for goods and services ‘that are supplied with 
explicit prices on which a VAT can be imposed’35, which is lacking in the case of 
insurance provision.  
 
3.2 Functioning  
 
Given that the wording of the directive gives very little detail regarding the functioning 
of the exemption or its scope, it is necessary to look to the Court’s jurisprudence to 
determine the real nature of the exemption and how it functions in reality. It is only by 
gaining an understanding of how the exemption truly works, that any valid assessment 
on the potential applicability of another system can be rendered. The following case 
based examples are used to demonstrate the true functioning of the exemption in 
practice and the legal problems facing the implementation of a new system.   
 
3.2.1 Coverage 
 
Under Article 135(1)(a), no definition or guidance is given for what constitutes 
‘insurance and reinsurance transactions’ . However, through its jurisprudence, the Court 
has interpreted these concepts to provide a more detailed classification. Undoubtedly, 
                                                 
31 Council Directive 77/388/EEC 
32 Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
33 Impact Assessment accompanying COM/2007/747 
34 Rita de la Feria, ‘The EU VAT Treatment of Insurance and Financial Services (Again) Under Review’ 
EC Tax Review, 2007/2, 74 
35 Howell H. Zee, ‘A New Approach to Taxing Financial Intermediation Services Under a Value-Added 
Tax’ (2004) IMF Working Paper (WP/04/119) 6 
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the leading case on this matter is Card Protection Plan (CPP)36. In this case, in relation 
to the issue of insurance transactions37, the Court was asked whether a firm, CPP, who 
supplied a service to customers whose credit cards were lost or stolen, but engaged an 
insurance broker to arrange the insurance policies, was carrying out an insurance 
transaction. CPP, taking the view that they were carrying out exempt insurance 
transactions, had not charged their customers VAT, however, the UK tax authorities 
contended this outlook.  
 
In relation to the coverage of the insurance exemption, there are several relevant points 
from the judgement that are worth noting. Firstly, the Court repeats settled case law that 
exemptions are to be strictly construed38 and ‘constitute independent concepts of 
Community law’39, which shows that their meaning and scope are defined only by 
Community law, and not by generally understood notions outside of this field, legal or 
otherwise. Furthermore, the Court explained that there is no reason for the interpretation 
of ‘insurance’ in the Sixth Directive to differ from that of the insurance directive. The 
Court goes on to describe the essentials of an insurance transaction, which were held to 
be that ‘the insurer undertakes, in return for prior payment of a premium, to provide the 
insured, in the event of materialisation of the risk covered, with the service agreed when 
the contract was concluded.’40 In the light of these criteria, however, it was held to be 
down to the national court to determine whether CPP had accepted insurance 
obligations,41 although the Member States may not restrict the scope of the exemption 
to insurers authorised by national law. Although the treatment of intermediaries will be 
discussed in the next paragraph, it is important at this stage to note that the Court in 
CPP found that it would be contrary to the purpose of the exemption if the term 
‘insurance transactions’ referred ‘solely to transactions performed by insurers 
themselves’42 
 
Another case that illustrates the coverage of the exemption is Skandia43. In this case, 
there was a plan to transfer the administration and operations of a wholly owned 
insurance subsidiary (‘Livbolaget’) to the parent insurance company (Skandia), with the 
exception of the insurance liability, which would stay with the subsidiary company 
(‘Livbolaget’). The legal question referred to the Court of Justice was whether such an 
assumption of a commitment to run Livbolaget’s business activities could constitute an 
insurance transaction44 within the meaning of the exemption.  
 
In rejecting Skandia’s arguments, the Court noted that although insurance companies 
may be required to limit their objects to insurance business or operations, this does not 
mean that all of their transactions constitute insurance transactions for tax purposes, as 
                                                 
36 Case 349/96 CPP 
37 This case is also a key case for single/composite supplies  
38 Case 349/96 CPP, para 22. See also Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties v 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën. This principle has subsequently been consistently affirmed by the Court: 
See Case 346/95 Blasi v Finanzamt München I para 18 
39 C-349/96, Card Protection Plan judgment para 15. See also Case 453/93 Bulthuis-Griffioen v 
Inspecteur der Omzetbelasting para 21 and 22 
40 Case 349/96 CPP, para 17  
41 Ibid, para 19  
42 Ibid, para 23 
43 Case 240/99 Skandia 
44 It was commonly agreed that it did not constitute reinsurance, Case 240/99 Skandia, para 20 
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referred to in the exemption.45 Furthermore, a distinction was made between the 
insurance exemption and other financial exemptions46, which formed the basis of the 
SDC47 case. In contrast to these other exemptions, which were said to ‘refer in a general 
way to transactions ‘concerning’ or involving’48 certain financial transactions, the 
insurance exemption covers ‘insurance transactions in the strict sense.’49 
 
Quoting the essentials from CPP50, the Court in Skandia then focused on the legal 
relationship between the insurer and the insured which had been created in this case51. 
The Court goes on to state that according to CPP, it appears that ‘an insurance 
transaction necessarily implies the existence of a contractual relationship between the 
provider of the insurance service’ and the insured.52 The assumption of the commitment 
was not sufficient to constitute an insurance transaction, given that it did not include the 
assumption of liability in respect of the insurance business53. The Skandia case 
therefore shows that in terms of the coverage of the exemption, the transfer of insurance 
liability and the existence of a contractual relationship are necessary conditions for an 
insurance transaction. This was also an issue in the Swiss Re case54 which concerned the 
transfer of a portfolio of contracts. Here, the timing of the existence of the legal 
relationship was also considered an important factor, with the transaction falling 
between two contractual relationships.  
 
A final case, which is also relevant in relation to the next subsection, is that of BGŻ 
Leasing55. This case involved BGŻ leasing items, with the condition that the items were 
insured. BGŻ could provide its clients with insurance, which it would then subscribe 
from an insurance company and re-invoice the costs to the lessee. It was contended 
whether this re-invoicing of the insurance cost was covered by the exemption, due to the 
argument that the supply of insurance was ancillary to the leasing service. The 
jurisprudence surrounding single/composite supplies is outside the scope of this thesis56, 
however, the Court noted that despite the fact that there is ‘necessarily a connection 
between the leased item and the relevant insurance’57, the insurance transactions can’t 
be subject to VAT solely on the basis that the relating item is subject to VAT. 
Furthermore, the insurance was held to constitute an end in itself, rather than a means to 
best enjoy the leasing service58, which is critical for a finding of the presence of 
separate supplies. In addition, the requirement for insurance cover can’t invalidate this 
                                                 
45 Case 240/99 Skandia para 34 
46 Case 349/96 CPP para 36, Art 13B(d)(3) and (5) in Council Directive 77/388/EEC, corresponding 
largely to Art 135(1)(d) and (e) in Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
47 Case 2/95 SDC 
48 Case 349/96 CPP para 36 
49 Ibid  
50 Case 240/99 Skandia para 37 
51 Ibid, para 39 
52 Ibid, para 41  
53 Case 349/96 CPP para 40 
54 Case 242/08 Swiss Re Germany Holding 
55 Case 224/11 BGŻ Leasing 
56 But can be found in the following cases: Case 392/11 Field Fisher Waterhouse, para 14, Case 
425/06 Part Service, para 51, Case 276/09 Everything Everywhere, para 23, Case 41/04 Levob 
Verzekeringen and OV Bank,  para 22, and Case 111/05 Aktiebolaget NN, para 23, Case 349/96 CPP, 
para 30, Case 242/08 Swiss Re Germany Holding, para 51 
57 Case 224/11 BGŻ Leasing para 36 
58 Ibid, para 42 
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finding, particularly given the option for sourcing the insurance independently59. In the 
light of these findings, the Court went on to hold the term ‘insurance transactions’ could 
cover this situation in which the lessor takes out insurance, at the request of its clients, 
with a third party insurer and then re-invoices this exact amount.  
 
3.2.2 Treatment of intermediaries   
 
The treatment of intermediaries plays a fundamental role in shaping the functioning of 
the insurance exemption and its coverage. The exemption in Article 135(1)(a) includes 
‘related services performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents’, which, 
alongside the need for a contractual link between the insurer and the insured, has been 
the subject of much case law in the Court of Justice.  
 
Once again, CPP is a good starting point for evaluation. Alongside the Court ruling that 
the term ‘insurance transactions’ was broad enough to cover ‘provision of insurance 
cover by a taxable person who is not himself an insurer’60, the opinion of AG Fennelly 
is particularly useful regarding the interpretation of the exemption in relation to 
intermediaries. As a starting point, the AG rightly interprets that ‘related services’ are 
only exempt if provided by insurance agents or brokers and that the term ‘related 
services’ includes any services related to the provision of insurance.61 The crucial issue 
in relation to intermediaries is therefore who qualifies as an agent or broker. To 
determine this, the AG looked to the relevant contemporaneous Community insurance 
legislation62, and noted that the wording of the Sixth Directive shows a purposeful use 
of the separate terms ‘insurance agents’ and ‘insurance brokers’, ‘rather than to use a 
more general term such as insurance ‘intermediaries’’.63 Such an interpretation narrows 
the potential scope of the exemption, a limitation which the AG felt would otherwise 
deprive the exemption of any meaning if ‘any intermediary whatever which is 
incidentally involved in arranging insurance ipso facto came within the definition.’64 
 
The question remains, however, what the critical elements of an agent or broker are, in 
contrast to those of a more general intermediary nature. Here, the AG noted that the use 
of the more restricted terms refers to ‘persons whose names professional activity 
comprises the bringing together of insurance undertakings and persons seeking 
insurance’.65Although the AG was not explicit about whether only authorised 
agents/brokers are covered by the exemption, Jespersen has interpreted his use of the 
term ‘professional’ to most likely imply that ‘non-authorised agents or brokers are not 
likely to meet the necessary criteria to be covered by the exemption.’66 
 
                                                 
59 Ibid, para 43  
60 Case 349/96 CPP para 22  
61 Case 349/96 CPP, Opinion of AG Fennelly, para 31  
62 Council Directive 77/92/EEC of 13 December 1976 on measures to facilitate the effective exercise of 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of the activities of insurance agents 
and brokers (ex ISIC Group 630) and, in particular, transitional measures in respect of those activities, OJ 
L 26, 31/01/1977, p. 14 (Council Directive 77/92/EEC) 
63 Case 349/96 CPP, Opinion of AG Fennelly, para 32  
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid 
66 Claus Bohn Jespersen, Intermediation of Insurance and Financial Services in European VAT 
(EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation Vol 30, Wolters Kluwer 2011) 194 
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As with ‘insurance transactions’, legal relationships play a significant role in defining 
the scope of insurance agents and brokers. Although not a question referred to the 
Court, AG Saggio in Skandia quickly ruled out the possibility of Skandia being 
regarded as a broker or agent, on the sole ground that ‘it has no legal relationship with 
the insured’67. Later, in Taksatorringen68, which concerned the possible exemption of 
damage assessment services, both AG Mischo and the Court were of the opinion that 
the provisions apply only to ‘professionals who have a relationship with both the 
insurance company and persons seeking insurance’.69 The Court ruled out the 
possibility of Taksatorringen fulfilling the conditions of the contemporaneous 
Community legislation on insurance70 as this included the power to render the insurer 
liable in case of loss, which wasn’t possible given Taksatorringen only had a contractual 
relationship with the insurer, and not the insured.  
 
Building upon this, AG Maduro in Arthur Andersen71 believed that the ‘decisive 
aspect’72 in the relationship between the agent and policy holder ‘necessarily implies the 
existence of an agent's own declarations’73 towards the policyholder, with the agent 
‘acting on behalf of and possibly in the name of the insurer.’74 This position of acting 
‘in the name and on behalf of, or solely on behalf of’75 the insurer was interpreted by 
AG Maduro to conclude that ‘the power to render the insurer liable cannot be the 
decisive criterion’76 as when acting solely on behalf (and not in the name) of the insurer, 
the agent does not have this power to render the insurer liable.77 Other conditions were 
deemed necessary to be fulfilled.78Given that exemptions are to be interpreted strictly, 
the AG was against a possible extension of the concept of insurance agent,79 as 
expressed earlier in Taksattoringen, so concluded that an agent’s activity should be 
viewed ‘as a supply of services on a professional basis, which begins and ends in itself 
and which thus has an independent substance distinct from the business of the 
insurer.’80 The AG’s opinion was then followed by the Court.   
 
The following case of Beheer81 introduces some unclarity into the line of jurisprudence 
of the Court of Justice up until this point. In this case, although the activities carried out 
by Beheer were ‘unquestionably the characteristic activities of an insurance broker or 
agent’82, Beheer was only in ‘an indirect relationship with one of the parties to an 
insurance contract.’83 In spite of this, the Court re-evaluated and qualified its judgement 
in the previous cases of Taksatorringen and Arthur Andersen, to conclude that it had not 
                                                 
67 Case 240/99 Skandia, Opinion of AG Saggio, para 19 
68 Case 8/01 Taksatorringen 
69 Case 8/01 Taksatorringen, Opinion of AG Mischo, para 86 
70 Council Directive 77/92/EEC, Art. 2(1)(a) or 2(1)(b) 
71 Case 472/03 Arthur Andersen 
72 Ibid, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 28 
73 Ibid 
74 Ibid 
75 Council Directive 77/92/EEC , Article 2(1)(b). See also Case 8/01 Taksatorringen 
76 Case 472/03 Arthur Andersen, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 31  
77 Ibid 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid, para 40 and 41 
80 Ibid, para 33 
81 Case 124/07 Beheer 
82 Ibid, para 18 
83 Ibid, para 16 
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limited ‘the nature of that relationship to a specific form.’84 This allowed the Court to 
find that the indirect relationship with the insurers was sufficient to include Beheer’s 
activities under the exemption.  
 
3.2.3 Consequences of the location of insurance companies and customers  
 
As was briefly discussed earlier, the location of both insurance companies and their 
customers have important VAT consequences. For insurance companies, being located 
in a third country brings the advantage of not being subject to EU VAT on inputs. Due 
to differing rates within the Community itself, there can also be VAT consequences 
attached to the choice of MS to establish in. For example, if an insurance firm was to 
establish itself in Luxembourg, it would be subject to a lower VAT rate on its inputs 
than if it were to be established in a MS with a higher VAT rate, such as Sweden85.  
 
The extent of the negative consequences related to non-deductible input VAT is also 
affected by the firm’s client profile. The location of the customers is hugely significant 
for VAT purposes given Article 169(c) of the Directive, under which there is an 
additional scope of the right of deduction when the goods/services are used for certain 
exempt transactions, including insurance. This additional right of deduction exists 
‘where the customer is established outside the Community or where those transactions 
relate directly to goods to be exported out of the Community.’ Consequently, if an EU 
based insurance firm supplies its services predominantly to customers outside of the 
Community, it will be able to deduct a greater proportion of its input VAT in 
comparison to a similar firm which predominantly supplies to customers located within 
the EU. This additional scope for deduction is crucial for securing the international 
competitiveness of EU firms as otherwise they will be at a disadvantage compared to 
firms established outside of the EU, who don’t incur hidden VAT costs.  
 
This Article (169(c)) formed the basis of the Commission v UK86 case, which has 
important consequences relating to the location of taxable persons. The case concerned 
the UK treatment of denying the recovery of input VAT in respect of transactions 
referred to in Art 169(c), when carried out by taxable persons not established in the EU. 
The Commission applied to the Court for a declaration that this treatment amounted to a 
failure by the UK to comply with its obligations under Art 169 to 171 of the current 
VAT Directive and Art 2(1) of the Thirteenth VAT Directive.87 The case hinged on 
finding the correct interpretation of the provisions, in particular, whether the clear and 
precise wording should be followed, or going against this and following the overall 
logic of the VAT system. The Court, agreeing with the AG, found in favour of legal 
certainty by holding that the relevant provisions discussed did not confer the right to 
recover input tax in the MS in respect of goods and services used for the purposes of 
transactions falling under Art 169(c), where the trader is established outside the EU.  
 
                                                 
84 Ibid, para 24 
85 Luxembourg’s standard  rate is 15%, compared to Sweden’s standard rate of 25%, IBFD (correct as of 
15/05/2014)  
86Case 582/08 Commission v United Kingdom 
87 Thirteenth VAT Directive 86/560/EEC of 17 November 1986 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable 
persons not established in Community territory, OJ L 326, 21/11/1986,  p. 40 (Thirteenth VAT Directive 
86/560/EEC) 
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The result of this case is that there is clearly no obligation, and indeed no legal basis, for 
providing a refund to traders in this situation who are established outside of the EU. 
Such a judgement, while undoubtedly reaching the right conclusion in terms of the 
correct interpretation of the Directives in the light of legal certainty, creates problems 
for the functioning of the VAT system.  The AG notes that commentators have 
suggested that the ‘possibility to deduct or refund was granted in order to ensure the 
competitive neutrality of EU financial and insurance service providers on international 
financial markets by introducing a possibility to alleviate tax cascading’88. This possible 
underlying reason of ensuring international competitiveness of the EU financial sector 
doesn’t go against the findings of the Court, however there are likely to be other 
consequences of the judgment. For example, as taxable persons not established in the 
EU are not entitled to a refund of input VAT on these respective goods and services, 
they are likely to be dissuaded from sourcing such goods/services from suppliers in the 
EU and instead source them from outside the EU so that EU VAT will not apply to 
these inputs.  
 
This result only applies to a certain extent however, as the application of this 
interpretation of the provisions is not consistent throughout the MS. This practical 
problem was invoked by the Commission, given that the majority of MS ‘currently 
allow refunds to persons not established in the EU and carrying out the transactions 
contained in Article 169(c) of the VAT Directive’89, which is in breach of the VAT 
Directives. The scope of entitlement to refunds is far from consistently applied 
throughout the EU, which undermines the functioning of the VAT system and adds to 
the negative results of the exemption.  
 
3.2.4 Risk materialisation 
 
The final section in this chapter deals with what happens when an insured risk 
materialises and the VAT implications of indemnity payments. As a starting point, the 
indemnity payments to the insured are classified not as consideration for supply, which 
is the basis of VAT, but rather as compensation for loss sustained. For this reason, the 
indemnity payments do not include VAT. This is true whether the indemnity payment is 
made to a VAT registered business or to a private individual.  
 
In relation to settlements in kind, as insurers are exempt, they are unable to recover any 
VAT incurred when replacing goods or carrying out repairs for the insured. If, on the 
other hand, the insured is directly supplied with the goods/repair service, rather than the 
supply being made to the insurer, the deductibility of the VAT included on these 
supplies is determined by the VAT status of the insured party. A tax registered business 
will therefore be able to deduct the VAT included in the supply, provided the supply 
relates to insured property which is for business use. In this case, where the insured can 
make a deduction for the VAT, the insurer will normally make an indemnity payment to 
the insured to cover only the net amount. Insurers will then be better off if making 
settlements in kind to VAT registered parties who are directly supplied with the 
goods/repair service, rather than non-registered parties, as there is a possibility to cover 
only the net amount, whereas there is no possibility for the insurer to deduct the input 
                                                 
88 Case 582/08 Commission v United Kingdom, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 32. See Oskar also 
Henkow, Financial Activities in European VAT (Kluwer Law International 2008)  286. 
89 Ibid, para 66 
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VAT included in replacement goods/services to be supplied to a non-registered party. In 
this situation, where the insurer covers only the net amount to VAT registered parties 
who in effect have the benefit of input VAT recovery on the acquisition, there is 
neutrality between VAT registered and non-registered parties.  
 
In relation to cash indemnity payments, however, there is a lack of neutrality between 
VAT registered and non-registered insured parties. As cash payments to both are 
exclusive of VAT, when the parties go on to purchase the replacement goods/repair 
service themselves, the non-registered party is worse off, as the payment they receive is 
exclusive of VAT, but the replacement they have to purchase (assuming it is taxable) 
will be inclusive of VAT, which they can’t deduct. VAT registered businesses, 
however, also receive the cash payment exclusive of VAT, but when purchasing the 
replacement, they will be able to deduct the VAT included. For a VAT registered 
business, therefore, the two outcomes of a payment in kind or in cash are equally as 
beneficial, but for a non-registered party, receiving a cash payment is less beneficial 
compared to receiving a payment in kind.   
4. The Kiwi system of taxing insurance  
 
4.1 Background and provisions  
 
In New Zealand, Goods and Services Tax (GST) is imposed on supplies of goods and 
services90. The statutory provisions of the tax are enshrined in the NZ Goods and 
Services Tax Act 1985 (GST Act), where a tax rate of 15% is imposed on supplies of 
goods and services91. In contrast to the EU exemption for insurance transactions, New 
Zealand subjects insurance transactions to its GST. It does so by ‘ignoring the 
theoretical nicety of attempting to determine the true value added by the insurer’s 
intermediation activities’92 and instead is based upon the business cash flow of the 
insurance firm. The system has been described as shifting the determination of the 
taxable value added from an individual policy basis to the level of the insurance 
company.93  
 
4.2 Mechanism   
 
The basics of the tax are that the insurer charges GST on premiums received and claims 
input tax credits for both insurance payments and the firm’s costs attributable to taxable 
insurance. The treatment by the insurance firm therefore does not distinguish between 
GST registered and non GST registered customers. The insured party, if GST registered, 
can claim input tax credits on the premiums paid94 and on payments it receives.95 If not 
                                                 
90 GST Act, s8 
91 GST Act, s8(1) 
92 Thomas G. Thornbury, ‘A Better Way To Include General Insurance in VAT Systems’ (1991) 
International VAT Monitor May (5), 2 at 3 
93 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘A proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to insurance services in the European Union’ 
(2013) Int Tax Public Finance 20, 867 at 868  
94 GST Act, s20(3)(d)  
95 New Zealand Inland Revenue Department (December 2000) Tax Information Bulletin: Vol 12, No 12, 
17 
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GST registered, the insured must pay GST on the premium and receives indemnity 
payments which are grossed up to include GST.  
 
The two diagrams below illustrate the mechanics of a premium being paid and a claim 
being made under the policy.  
 
Premiums paid under policy – general position  
 
 
The first diagram (above) represents the situation of a premium being paid under a 
general insurance policy. In supplying the promise of insurance, the NZ insurer incurs 
costs with input GST, which it is then able to deduct as it supplies a taxed service. The 
premiums received, as consideration, also include GST, which the insurer accounts for. 
This is true regardless of the taxable status of the insured party, as the premium always 
includes GST whether the insured is GST registered or not. The insured, if GST 
registered, is able to deduct this GST paid on the premium as input tax96, with a non-
GST registered insured party not having this ability.  
 
Claim under policy – general position  
 
This second diagram (above) represents the situation of a claim being made under a 
policy when the insured risk materialises. Note that the ‘Insured’ party in the previous 
diagram has been replaced by the ‘Recipient’ of the indemnity payout, as for GST 
purposes, the liability to account for GST lies with the recipient, regardless of whether 
they are a party to the insurance contract. If a successful claim is made under the 
insurance contract, the insurer makes a payout which includes GST, regardless of the 
GST status of the recipient. The insurer is then able to claim a deduction for this GST 
that is included in the payout97. Only if the recipient is GST registered, and the payout 
                                                 
96 GST Act, s20(3)(d)  
97 Ibid 
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amount relates to their taxable business, must they account for the GST on the amount 
received.98 
 
Numerical example – supply of general insurance 
 
The example will use a hypothetical insurance company which sells taxable insurance 
policies for a total of $1,150,000 in June 2014. 
$700,000 of those policies was sold to taxpayers who are general GST taxpayers. 
$450,000 of those policies (the remainder) was sold to private individuals.  
 
During June 2014, the insurer pays out total cash settlements of $1,000,000. 
$600,000 of those settlements was paid to general GST taxpayers. 
$400,000 of those settlements (the remainder) was paid to private individuals. 
 
The GST rate used in this example is 15%, as this is the current applicable rate for 
general insurance in NZ99. 
 
On payment of the premium 
 
Insurer’s GST is = 1,150,000 x 0.15/1.15    $150,000 
Insured’s input GST credit is = 700,000 x 0.15/1.15   $91,304 
 
On cash settlement of the claims 
 
Insured’s GST is = 600,000 x 0.15/1.15    $78,261 
Insurer’s deemed input GST credit = 1,000,000 x 0.15/1.15  $130,435 
 
GST Liability         $26,087 
    
Result 
 
Only the margin of $200,000 attributable to sales to private individuals is subject to 
GST of $26,087 (being 200,000 x 0.15/1.15) 
 
As can be seen from this numerical example, the value added, and therefore the 
VAT/GST liability is ‘not calculated on a policy-by-policy basis, but rather, is pooled 
amongst all of the premiums invoiced and claims paid during each tax period’100, which 
in this example is the duration of June 2014. It is purely the cash flow of premiums 
received and settlements paid that determines the VAT liability, the insurer ‘does not 
take into account reserves or other accruals in that calculation.’101 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 GST Act, 5(13) 
99 GST Act, s8(1) 
100 KPMG, Proposed Introduction of VAT for the Insurance Sector in China, August 2013, 19 
101 Ibid 
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5. Application of the Kiwi system to EU VAT  
 
5.1 Could the Kiwi system be applied?  
 
5.1.1 Differences that could affect replication  
 
It is widely accepted that applying the current exemption to insurance transactions is not 
an ideal treatment, and indeed the Commission has outlined proposals for reform which 
would broaden the tax base.102 Cnossen, amongst others, has proposed to integrate 
property and casualty insurance services fully within the VAT base103, ‘basically by 
adopting the approach found in countries with modern VAT systems, such as New 
Zealand.’104 In theory, and when focusing purely on the financial aspects, proposals 
along these lines can’t be criticised, especially given the negative consequences of the 
exemption which were discussed earlier.  
 
However, it is submitted that vital aspects have been overlooked, which make such 
proposals seem slightly unrealistic in practice. Focus has been placed on the functioning 
of the tax system itself and the economic and financial aspects; however there are 
critical differences between New Zealand and the EU, which have the power to 
dramatically affect the potential replication of the system. These differences include 
those that are economic, social, political and legal in nature, and cannot be overlooked.  
 
New Zealand is a country with a current population estimated at 4.5m people105, with 
the EU having a population estimated at 507m people106.  In terms of GDP, which is 
perhaps a more useful comparison tool, the GDP of New Zealand in 2012 was an 
estimated $171.3 billion107, compared to $16.66 trillion in the EU.108 In this case, the 
EU has a GDP nearly 100 times greater than that of New Zealand. As GDP represents 
the ‘monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced’109, it also serves as 
a reasonable indicator of the scope of economic transactions subject to the tax system in 
place. Comparing the specific total gross premium figures for insurance shows the sheer 
magnitude of the insurance industry in the EU compared to NZ. In 2008, the gross 
premiums in NZ totalled $3,144 million, whereas in 15 EU countries, the figure stood at 
$624,742 million.110 Such an exceptionally greater value (and volume) of insurance 
                                                 
102 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘A proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to insurance services in the European Union’ 
(2013) Int Tax Public Finance 20, 867. See COM/2007/747 and COM/2007/746 
103 Ibid at 868 
104 Ibid 
105 Figure taken from Statistics New Zealand, available online at 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/tools_and_services/population_clock.aspx (accessed 09/05/2014) and rounded to 
two significant figures.  
106 Figure taken from Europa (data sourced from Eurostat) available online at http://europa.eu/about-
eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm (accessed 09/05/2014) and rounded to three significant figures.  
107 Figure in USD. Figure taken from the World Bank. Available online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/new-zealand accessed 09/05/2014 
108 Figure in USD. Figure taken from the World Bank. Available online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/EUU accessed 09/05/2014 
109 Investopedia, available online at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp (accessed 09/05/2014) 
110OECD.StatExtracts, Insurance Indicators, available online at 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=25437 (accessed 30/05/2014) Figure in USD and includes only 
non-life policies, including both insurance and reinsurance. 15 EU countries included are: Belgium, 
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transactions makes the effective and efficient application of the NZ system questionable 
in practice on such an enormous economic scale, given that it has never been tested on 
such an extensive basis.  
 
Despite these tremendous economic differences, potentially the greatest difficulties 
facing the adoption of the NZ system are the legal differences between the two systems. 
GST only needs to be applicable to one legal system, that of New Zealand, whereas EU 
VAT needs to be applicable throughout the 28 sovereign MS, all of which have 
different legal systems. Given that these 28 sovereign Member States have varying 
VAT rates, it is unlikely that the adoption of a taxed system would function as 
efficiently and as smoothly as the NZ system which is limited to one legal system. As 
Englisch has noted, ‘the fact that VAT is harmonized at EU level but mostly 
implemented though national VAT Acts constitutes a particular challenge with regard to 
its uniform and principle-based interpretation.’111 
 
An additional problem related to multiple Member States are place of supply issues. In 
New Zealand this doesn’t cause many problems as the GST only applies to one State, 
which has a uniform tax rate throughout, so the place of supply is only relevant in 
relation to supplies involving other countries. In the EU however, the place of supply is 
of great importance given the varying rates within the EU, which create a situation 
whereby, in addition to the place of supply issues concerning third countries, there are 
also such issues related to transactions carried out within the EU but involving more 
than one MS. Despite these differences, however, the fundamentals of value added tax 
systems contain many similarities, which make comparisons between systems easier 
than for other types of taxes. The structure and reasoning behind a VAT lends itself to 
discussions of technical ways to solve problems. 
 
5.1.2 Feasibility of removing the exemption  
 
Aside from the legal ramifications and challenges, the political context is worthy of 
consideration, given the practical issues it presents in reality. Implementing a change in 
the VAT Directive, such as removing the exemption for insurance transactions and 
subjecting them to a NZ style value added tax, would require the unanimous consent of 
all Member States112. Agreeing on changes such as this is likely to be an extremely long 
and challenging process, particularly because the MS will be effected in different ways 
depending on many factors such as whether they are net importers/exporters of 
insurance services and their VAT rates. 
 
Despite this, indications from the 1973 Hutchings Report, from before the introduction 
of the exemption, concluded that the most serious objection to imposing VAT on 
insurance was ‘the absence of a readily identifiable mechanism’113 for doing so. A 
recent Commission Consultation Paper notes that there was a ‘widespread perception at 
                                                                                                                                               
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Austria, Sweden, Finland. 
111 Joachim Englisch, ‘The EU Perspective on VAT Exemptions’ in Rita de la Feria, VAT Exemptions:  
Consequences and Design Alternatives (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Vol 3, Wolters Kluwer 
2013) 39 
112 See Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
113 European Commission, Consultation Paper on Modernising Value Added Tax Obligations for 
Financial Services and Insurances (DG Taxation and Customs Union Brussels, 2006) 2 
 19 
 
the time that a technical solution allowing the introduction of full taxation on insurance 
and financial services, which was seen as the best option to rectify the breach in 
neutrality, would duly be identified.’114  This could show that, if accepted as such a 
mechanism for doing so, the Member States may agree to the implementation of the 
New Zealand system. However, it must be taken into account that at that stage of the 
EU’s development, only six Member States existed and were consulted in the Report. 
Given the rapid expansion of the EU and the evolution of the insurance industry which 
has grown in complexity, reaching agreement on the introduction of the system, and 
indeed the specific workings of the system, is undoubtedly going to be a more 
formidable task than at the time of the exemption’s introduction.  
 
More light can be shed on the feasibility of removing the exemption from the 
Commission’s proposal for a Directive115 to modernise and simplify the VAT rules for 
insurance. The proposal aims at setting clear, modern definitions of exempt services and 
introducing the ability to opt for taxation. The proposal has been described as the ‘result 
of a political agenda set out in 2000 aimed at changing the legislation regarding the 
VAT treatment of insurance and financial services.’116 The consultation process began 
in 2004117, however the progress has been slow and arduous with each Presidency 
releasing compromise texts of the proposals118, which ‘show the difficulties in agreeing 
on an amendment of the current legislation.’119 Furthermore, most scepticism from 
national delegates has surrounded the proposed mandatory option to tax at the choice of 
financial institutions120. Given the limited progress of these proposals on the same area, 
it is likely that a proposal to introduce the NZ system would be faced with as much, if 
not more, difficulty given how significant the change would be.   
 
5.1.3 Transitional issues  
 
Assuming the feasibility of removing the exemption and applying the Kiwi system, 
consideration must also be given to transitional issues that would undoubtedly occur 
given the extensiveness of the changes, and which arise as a result of all tax reforms. 
Although a thorough examination of these issues is outside the scope of this thesis, it is 
interesting to briefly note a few, given that any resultant benefits in relation to this must 
also be able to justify such a profound system change.121 These transitional issues may 
be amplified exponentially in relation to the number of MS applying the changes. Even 
                                                 
114 European Commission, Consultation Paper on Modernising Value Added Tax Obligations for 
Financial Services and Insurances (DG Taxation and Customs Union Brussels, 2006) 2 
115 COM/2007/747, supported by COM/2007/746 
116 Claus Bohn Jespersen, Intermediation of Insurance and Financial Services in European VAT 
(EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation Vol 30, Wolters Kluwer 2011) at 388. Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – A strategy to improve the operation of the 
VAT system within the context of the internal market, COM/2000/348 final (COM/2000/348) 
117 COM/2007/747, 5 
118 For greater detail see Claus Bohn Jespersen, Intermediation of Insurance and Financial Services in 
European VAT (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation Vol 30, Wolters Kluwer 2011)  387  
119 Ibid 
120 See Document 15793/08 FISC 156, 14 November 2008 from Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union to the Working Party on Tax Questions – Indirect Taxation (VAT), at 3-6; and 
Document 11013/08 FISC 80, 23 June 2008   
121 European Commission, Consultation Paper on Modernising Value Added Tax Obligations for 
Financial Services and Insurances (DG Taxation and Customs Union Brussels, 2006) p2 and 3, regarding 
the Commissions 1990’s proposals. 
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when changes are limited to one State (such as a change relating only to the NZ 
system), transitional issues can be challenging and costly, however, when applied 
throughout an area such as the EU, these issues are likely to be vast as they apply on a 
much greater scale.  
 
There exists a ‘stubborn fact that legal transitions produce winners and losers’122, the 
extent of this being determined both by the changes themselves and the economic 
choices made in reliance of the previous exemption system. For example, some 
insurance firms may have chosen less economically efficient structuring methods, such 
as vertical integration, in order to be tax efficient when subject to the exemption. When 
a tax is imposed, these firms will lose the tax advantages they were benefitting from and 
be left with an economically inefficient business structure. Perhaps the most crucial 
transitional issue is the date that VAT would become applicable to insurance 
transactions. Given the method for calculating the value added in NZ, using both the 
premium received and the indemnity payment made, it would be logical that if VAT 
were to apply, it would be imposed on both of these payments. For example, if an 
insurance premium was paid before the imposition of VAT, but the indemnity payment 
was made afterwards, the insurer should not be able to deduct VAT for the indemnity 
payment made, assuming that no VAT was received on the insurance premium. For this 
reason, VAT should only apply to new policies agreed after the date of imposition, as 
this way both relevant payments are subject to the same tax treatment, whether exempt 
or taxed.  
 
Just touching on a few of the other issues can give a good indication of the intensity and 
scope of the problems. For example, the timing of MS transposing the changes to the 
Directive is critical to ensure a harmonious application of the taxed system and reducing 
tax planning opportunities. The accounting practices will also have to be completely 
recast to fit the new system which lies outside of the standard invoice-credit basis. The 
revenue authorities of Member States will need to issue new guidelines, update their 
practices and IT systems and retrain staff. There is a possibility that current insurance 
policies, especially those with an extended duration, may need to be updated and re-
negotiated in the light of the taxed system, depending on the was in which the new tax 
is imposed. Finally, but by no means an exhaustion of the issues, businesses are likely 
to incur increased administrative costs in order to comply with the new system.  
 
5.2 Functioning   
 
5.2.1 Coverage 
 
Despite being rather basic and somewhat circular in nature, the GST Act, unlike the 
VAT Directive, provides a definition of insurance. S2(1) states that ‘insurance means 
insurance or guarantee against loss, damage, injury, or risk of any kind whatever, 
whether pursuant to any contract or any enactment; and includes reinsurance; 
and contract of insurance includes a policy of insurance, an insurance cover, and a 
renewal of a contract of insurance’.123 As an exception to the general principle that 
                                                 
122 Michael Doran, ‘Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition Policy’ (2007) University of Chicago 
Law Review, Vol. 74, 545 
123 GST Act, s 2(1)  
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turnover tax is levied on all goods or services supplied for consideration by a taxable 
person, the insurance exemption, like other exemptions, must be interpreted strictly and 
indeed the Court of Justice has done so.124 The Kiwi definition of insurance, however, 
does not relate to an exemption, so strict interpretation is neither necessary, nor 
appropriate.  
 
It is likely, therefore, that the New Zealand concept of (taxed) insurance is wider than 
the EU concept of exempt insurance transactions. If the EU were to adopt the Kiwi 
approach, the coverage of the terms used is likely to increase as the logic behind a strict 
interpretation will be removed with the exemption. An important distinction then arises 
between, on the one hand, transactions which currently fall under the exemption, and 
which would then be subject to the Kiwi style taxed system when adopted, and on the 
other hand, those transactions which do not currently fall within the strict scope of the 
exemption, so presumably would not be subject to the Kiwi style taxed system when 
adopted. The outcome could be that, insurance transactions which currently fall within 
the exemption will be subject to the Kiwi style of tax and other transactions, which may 
be also be related to insurance but haven’t fallen within the strict interpretation, are 
subject to the existing EU VAT. This could result in two types of VAT systems, one on 
a cash-flow basis (Kiwi) and one on an invoice-credit basis (EU) being applied to 
questionably similar insurance related transactions, given that the basis for the strict 
interpretation which acts as the determining factor between exempt and non-exempt 
transactions has been lost.  
 
Alternatively, the starting point could be that a wider scope is used to define insurance 
transactions (which would then need to be determined), so that the Kiwi style VAT 
applies to all insurance related transactions and not just those that previously fell under 
the strict exemption. However, there are also several issues with this approach, 
especially as it is likely to subject transactions which are currently taxed under EU VAT 
to Kiwi style VAT instead, rather than just subjecting currently exempt transactions to 
VAT. The critical issue here is in determining the correct scope of the application of the 
NZ style VAT and ensuring a clear division between transactions which are subject to 
this, and those that are subject to the EU VAT. If this is not done successfully, the result 
could be that the two styles of VAT system overlap, or leave gaps, in their coverage. 
Where there is any uncertainty in the application of either system, especially in terms of 
coverage, disparities are likely to arise between the treatment given in each MS, which 
undermines the success of the VAT and creates problems for revenue authorities, the 
courts (both national courts and the Court of Justice), insurers and the insured parties.  
 
Ultimately, the critical problem attached to the EU exemption is a definitional one. Due 
to the presence of the exemption, it is crucial that there is a strict borderline division 
between what is taxed and what is classified as exempt. As is the case whenever there is 
the presence of a special rule, in this case the exemption, the distinction between the 
classification of transactions is fundamental given the differing tax treatments available. 
If we were to remove this special rule and introduce a system whereby insurance is 
subject to tax just like other supplies of services, the definitional problem that plagues 
                                                 
124 C-349/96, Card Protection Plan judgment para 22. See also Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering 
Financiële Acties v Staatssecretaris van Financiën. This principle has subsequently been consistently 
affirmed by the Court: See Case 346/95 Blasi v Finanzamt München I para 18 
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the EU system could be resolved as it would no longer be necessary to define such strict 
borderlines between categories of transactions.  
 
5.2.2 Treatment of intermediaries   
 
The NZ GST Act contains provisions relating to agents, under which ‘where an agent 
makes a supply of goods and services for and on behalf of any other person who is the 
principal of that agent, that supply shall be deemed to be made by that principal and not 
by that agent’.125 The condition for being considered an agent is that they must have the 
power to ‘issue a tax invoice or a credit note or a debit note in relation to that supply as 
if that agent had made a taxable supply’, provided the principle does not do so in 
addition to the agent.126 As discussed earlier, the EU jurisprudence uses the terms ‘in 
the name and on behalf of, or solely on behalf of’127 to describe the relationship between 
the actions of an agent and an insurer, which directly relate to the NZ provision whereby 
agents make supplies ‘for and on behalf’128 of the principal.  
 
Although the wording to define an agent’s activities seems similar in the EU and NZ, 
given that the terms used in the Directive, ‘related services performed by insurance 
brokers and insurance agents’129, are defined in terms of the exemption which must be 
strictly interpreted, the Court of Justice has stopped attempts to extend the application 
of the concept of an agent.130 Furthermore, as concepts of the VAT Directive, the terms 
‘insurance brokers’ and ‘insurance agents’ have an independent Community 
definition.131 Such a definition has been the subject of much case law in the Court of 
Justice, however in New Zealand the intermediary service has uncontroversially been 
considered to simply follow the tax treatment of the underlying supply, so is far less 
reliant on a strict definitional basis of the person themselves.  
 
If the Kiwi system were to be applied, a decision over which concept of intermediary, 
whether the strictly disputed EU concept or the wider, less disputed Kiwi concept, is to 
apply in the new system. In its jurisprudence, when determining the scope of the terms 
‘insurance agents’ and ‘insurance brokers’, the Court of Justice looked to the 
contemporaneous insurance Directive132 relating to insurance agents and brokers, in 
order to define the scope of the concepts. For this reason, if the Kiwi system were to be 
applied, attention would have to be given to determining the scope of the concepts and 
how they fit in line with other non-VAT related EU legislation.  
 
Like the coverage of the exemption however, the use of a taxed system could largely 
limit the definitional problems that arise in relation to the borderline distinction that is 
required by the strictly interpreted EU concept of agents and brokers, as the activities of 
                                                 
125 GST Act, s60(1) 
126 Ibid 
127 Council Directive 77/92/EEC, Article 2(1)(b). See also Case 8/01 Taksatorringen 
128 GST Act, s60(1) 
129 Council Directive 2006/112/EC, Art 135(1)(a) 
130 Case 472/03 Arthur Andersen 
131 Claus Bohn Jespersen, Intermediation of Insurance and Financial Services in European VAT 
(EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation Vol 30, Wolters Kluwer 2011) 93. See also Paul Farmer and 
Richard Lyal, EC Tax Law (Clarendon Press 1995) 90. See also Anthony Arnull, The European Union 
and its Court of Justice (Oxford EC Law Library, 2nd edn, 2006) 
132 Council Directive 77/92/EEC 
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both those falling inside and outside of the category would be subject to tax. 
Furthermore, in relation to both the coverage and individual terms such as ‘agents’ and 
‘brokers’, the definitional problem in the EU exists due to the context in which the 
system operates. This is because in the EU, the exemption provisions need to be applied 
universally, so parallels between civil laws and EU laws can’t be formulated, with the 
concepts requiring their own EU VAT definition. With the Kiwi system, however, there 
is no need to have a separate definition, and common law concepts can be used to shape 
and define the provisions.  
 
5.2.3 Consequences of the location of insurance companies and customers 
 
Location is of great importance when determining GST liability. One of the main 
features that distinguishes GST from earlier VATs, especially the harmonised EU VAT, 
is that the ‘jurisdiction to tax is based on the residence of the supplier, not the location 
of the supply.’133 In theory, therefore, ‘a supplier resident in New Zealand is subject to 
GST on its worldwide supplies.’134 Section 8 of the GST Act, however, is said to 
‘narrow the scope of the tax considerably’135, and deals with the imposition of tax, 
whereby GST will only be charged on the supply in New Zealand of goods and 
services136, which is deemed to take place ‘if the supplier is resident in New Zealand, 
and shall be deemed to be supplied outside New Zealand if the supplier is a non-
resident.’137  
 
In relation to the right to deduct, location plays a significant role, as can be evaluated 
from s20 of the GST Act, under which a registered person (such as an insurer) can make 
a deduction from their output tax in only in specific circumstances.  This ability is 
restricted for several certain types of transaction, with location of some description 
being a determining factor. The right of deduction is refused for a registered person in 
situations including where the payment relates to goods situated outside of NZ (e.g. the 
insured goods are located outside of NZ), or services physically performed outside NZ 
and also in situations where the payment is made to a person who is not registered and 
is a non-resident138.  
 
Given the number of Member States in the EU, extra considerations would have to be 
made in order to apply the Kiwi style VAT to insurance transactions. In relation to place 
of supply issues, the Kiwi system is only concerned with activities either located inside 
New Zealand or outside of New Zealand, whereas the EU system needs to deal with a 
multitude of issues concerning activities taking place within the EU, but concerning 
multiple MS. This is particularly so given the existence of differing VAT rates and 
revenue authorities.  
 
 
                                                 
133 Alan Schenk and Oliver Oldman, Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach (Cambridge University 
Press 2007) 69 
134 Ibid at 70 
135 Ibid 
136 GST Act, s8(1) 
137 GST Act, s 8(2)  
138 GST Act, s20(3)(d)(ii) and (iv) 
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5.2.4 Risk materialisation  
 
There are important GST consequences when a risk materialises and an indemnity 
payment is made to the insured. If the insured is a GST registered person, the New 
Zealand system considers such a payment to be ‘consideration received for a supply of 
services performed by the registered person’139 regardless of whether the person is a 
party to the contract, so long as the payment relates to ‘a loss incurred in the course or 
furtherance of the registered person’s taxable activity’.140 As this is treated as a supply 
of services which are taxable in New Zealand, the payment is made to insured with GST 
included. The insured recipient of the payment then has to account for this GST, 
provided that the payment received relates to their taxable business. However, this GST 
component is creditable for the registered recipient, who can then report it as output tax. 
According to the GST Act, ‘the insurer can deduct from their amount of output tax 
attributable to the taxable period ‘an amount equal to the tax fraction of any payment 
made during the taxable period by that registered person to  another person pursuant to 
any contract of insurance’141, provided certain conditions are met.  
 
When combined, the input credit to the insurer and the output tax reportable by the 
registered insured, ‘the government does not receive any net GST revenue on a claim 
paid to GST-registered businesses that is attributable to the insured’s taxable 
activity.’142 Neutrality is also achieved in the amount of VAT credit between situations 
where ‘the insurance company pays the repair company for a $1,000 repair (on which 
$100 of VAT is due) or the insurance company pays the policyholder $1,100.’143 In 
terms of the indemnity payment, the insurer does not have to distinguish between GST 
liable and GST exempt persons, meaning that when the insured is unregistered, the 
payment is also grossed up to include VAT, so that the insured is able to ‘pay the GST-
inclusive cost to replace the lost property or repair the damaged property.’144  
 
Given the timing of transactions and lengthy periods needed to settle insurance claims, 
the New Zealand system has been criticised on the basis that the ‘Inland Revenue will 
have in its possession for extensive periods of time, sometimes years, an over-collection 
of the value added.’145 Furthermore, due to not distinguishing between GST liable and 
non-liable persons at the point of making the indemnity payment, there is added 
complication in the system whereby the GST liable person will have to pay the VAT 
they receive in the indemnity payment from the insurer to the Inland Revenue. Although 
not creating any legal issues in itself, this process makes the system more 
administratively complex. The Australian system is simpler in this regard, as it permits 
insurers to make such a distinction, resulting in GST liable persons receiving the 
indemnity payment without VAT included with the insurer correspondingly losing the 
                                                 
139 GST Act, s5(13) 
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ability to grant itself a credit.146 The experience in New Zealand is that, due to the 
system not distinguishing between GST registered and non-registered insured parties 
when making payouts, ‘there are relatively high levels of non-compliance’147. There are 
several explanations for this, which surround such a GST inclusive payment to GST 
registered parties being unusual in a value added tax system. The insured may be 
unaware of the liability to account for this GST component of the payout due to 
unfamiliarity with such a transaction, the lack of an invoice being issued which usually 
acts as a ‘trigger’ event, and misunderstandings relating to the nature of the payment as 
many will not consider they have supplied any good/service, which is normally the 
basis to account for VAT.148 Such compliance issues need to be taken account when 
proposing to implement a new system.  
 
Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 4.2, the contractual relationship relating to the 
indemnity payment doesn’t bear the same importance as in the EU system. In NZ, it is 
not the status of the insured that is relevant for indemnity payout purposes, but rather 
whoever is the recipient of the payout. The recipient may therefore not be a party to the 
insurance contract, so may be more likely not to fulfil the compliance requirements of 
accounting for the GST received, as the ‘obligation will be less obvious’.149 The 
Australian system manages to reduce this problem as the compliance obligations are 
placed on the insurers, who are likely to be better able to fulfil the obligations, rather 
than a broad range of GST registered insured parties.150 
 
In comparison to the EU system, greater neutrality is achieved between recipients of 
indemnity payments in relation to their GST status. In terms of a cash payment, as both 
GST registered and non-registered parties receive an indemnity payment including 
GST, the parties are in the same position with regards to then purchasing replacement 
goods for example, as the GST registered party has to account for the GST received. 
This is in contrast to the EU system, whereby both parties receive the cash payment 
exclusive of VAT, but a VAT-registered party can go on to deduct the VAT included in 
the replacement, whereas the non-registered party receives a VAT exclusive payment, 
with which they have to purchase VAT inclusive replacements (assuming the 
replacement goods/repair services are taxed). Although creating greater compliance 
burdens for VAT registered insured parties, the NZ system manages to solve the 
neutrality problem inherent in EU cash indemnity payments.  
 
In relation to payments in kind, there is also neutrality between GST registered and non-
registered insured parties. This is because the insurer can deduct the input GST included 
in the purchase of the goods (regardless of the tax status of the recipient), so then no 
output GST is accountable when the goods are supplied to the insured. For example, if 
both a GST registered and non-registered party settle an insurance claim in relation to a 
car, the insurer will purchase the car, claim an input GST deduction for it, and then 
supply it to the insured without any GST component included, so there is neutrality in 
relation to the replacement goods each party receives.   
 
                                                 
146 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘A proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to insurance services in the European Union’ 
(2013) Int Tax Public Finance 20, 867 at 879 
147 KPMG, Proposed Introduction of VAT for the Insurance Sector in China, August 2013, 22 
148 Ibid at 23 
149 Ibid 
150 Ibid at 22 
 26 
 
5.3 Would the application of the Kiwi system solve the problems 
associated with the EU exemption?  
 
Alongside exemptions being contrary to the general characteristics and purpose of a 
VAT, it is the negative consequences that result from the exemption that are responsible 
for increasing calls for change. Any system that is brought in to replace the exemption 
system for insurance would therefore need to address these negative consequences and 
hopefully substantially reduce them, if not alleviate them altogether.  
 
Of course, this would need to be done while simultaneously not introducing any 
significant new problems into the system. A direct adoption would need to ensure that it 
does not exacerbate other existing imperfections that exist in the EU VAT system in 
general, such as various disparate rates. In this example, the creation of new problems 
doesn’t result from faults in the NZ system in itself, but rather from the differences 
between the systems which make application challenging.  Of course, this could be 
reduced if the adoption of the Kiwi system were to be supported by a corresponding 
increase in VAT consistency throughout the MS. While such an outcome may be 
favourable to the working of the VAT system, it is a change that is likely to prove 
harder to implement in terms of MS agreement.  
 
5.3.1 Accumulation and under/over taxation depending on the status of the 
final consumer 
 
The problem of accumulation, which results in the over-taxation of insurance services 
supplied to businesses and an under-taxation of those supplied to final consumers, arises 
out of the inability to deduct input VAT costs from output VAT charged, precisely 
because there is no output VAT charged on exempt insurance services, meaning this 
input VAT cascades. Under the New Zealand system, which taxes the gross premiums, 
insurance providers can claim input credits for both VAT on ‘purchases attributable to 
taxable insurance and the “grossed-up” portion of claims paid.’151 Because of this 
ability to claim input credits, the problem of accumulation that is inherent in the current 
EU exemption is resolved.  
 
The existing issue of under-taxation of final consumers may be reversed, however, as 
the problem of determining the value-added rears its head again. The Kiwi system tries 
to get around this problem by shifting the determination of the taxable value added from 
an individual policy basis to the level of the insurance company152, however it seems in 
this instance, the Kiwi system doesn’t quite manage to escape the problem. This is 
because under the Kiwi system, those final consumers that cannot claim credit for the 
input tax paid on premiums bear GST on the gross premium ‘and not just on the value 
of the intermediation services rendered by the insurer’153, which is the real value added 
in the transaction. Schenk believes this can be justified by considering the difference 
between the gross premium and the value of the intermediation as ‘consumption similar 
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to a warranty agreement’154, however such a treatment is questionable. Despite this 
issue, the Kiwi system has, for the most part, avoided the problem of accumulation 
which plagues the EU insurance exemption, which is very persuasive in terms of 
choosing to implement the Kiwi system.   
 
5.3.2 Damaging international competitiveness of insurance firms 
 
EU insurance firms who source their input supplies from within the EU are currently at 
a competitive disadvantage when supplying to EU customers, who could otherwise use 
an insurance provider located in a third country, who is not subject to this input VAT. 
The main issue is that this input VAT, which can’t be deducted, forms a cost component 
for EU insurance firms. Applying the Kiwi style VAT would give insurance providers a 
credit for input purchases and claims paid, which could reduce this cost component.  
 
However, although the problem of input VAT affecting international competitiveness 
could be solved by allowing deductions, the removal of the exemption would result in 
EU insurance firms being forced to charge VAT on the premiums. Although indemnity 
payouts would then also include VAT, the cost of insurance premiums would be 
increased by the amount of VAT. EU businesses could then deduct this amount, making 
the supply comparative to sourcing insurance cover from a third country insurer. EU 
consumers, however, would have to bear the VAT cost on the gross premium, making 
supplies from EU insurers relatively more expensive than those from third country 
insurers who are not subject to EU VAT and would therefore not have to charge it on 
their insurance premiums, depending on the place of supply rules used to determine 
where the transaction is taxed. In this instance, the application of the Kiwi system 
would improve the competitiveness of EU insurance firms whose client base 
predominantly consists of businesses as the insurance firm can deduct input VAT (so it 
doesn’t become a cost component) and output VAT can be deducted by the insured, 
however the effect on those firms who make supplies to consumers will not be as 
favourable. Although the insurer can still deduct the input VAT, they will have to 
charge output VAT on the supply made which the consumer will have to bear.  
 
An interesting point to note is the overall effect on the cost of EU insurance cover for 
both businesses and consumers. Although there are many practical considerations which 
will affect the end premium price, in theory, upon application of the Kiwi system, 
businesses are likely to experience a reduction in the cost of insurance as the insurance 
firm can now recover its input VAT costs and the business can deduct the output VAT 
charged on the premium. For consumers, the overall effect on the price of insurance 
premiums is likely to increase, the extent to which will depend on the relationship 
between the amounts of input VAT the insurance firm can now deduct compared to the 
total output VAT charged.  
 
5.3.3 Vertical integration of the supply chain and preventing efficient 
structuring and division of tasks  
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The logic behind firms self-supplying, which results in vertical integration of the supply 
chain, rests in the intention of reducing the amount of non-deductible input VAT 
incurred on input supplies, and thus making the firm more competitive/profitable. 
Because the problem of non-deductible input VAT is resolved by the Kiwi system, the 
benefit of self-supplying has also been removed. As the insurer is entitled to recover 
VAT charged by its suppliers, decisions on whether to self-supply or source from third 
party suppliers no longer revolve around the VAT implications of doing so. Efficiency 
may therefore be increased as firms may opt to outsource required services to 
experienced specialist suppliers.  
 
At present, there are great VAT implications for services deemed to be carried out by 
insurance agents or brokers, given that they fall under the exemption. Because of this, 
the matter is heavily litigated. In cases such as Arthur Andersen155, which concerned the 
outsourced back office activities of the insurer, the finding that the activities didn’t fall 
within the scope of the exemption created an extra VAT burden and with a strict 
interpretation of the terms agents and brokers, firms are less likely to outsource these 
services. As explained previously, the imposition of the Kiwi system would remove the 
VAT disadvantages of outsourcing and as a tax would be imposed on the activities of 
insurance intermediaries, the area is likely to be less heavily disputed as there would be 
less at stake financially.  
 
Previous market distortions whereby larger insurance firms were at a competitive 
advantage due to their greater ability to self-supply will be corrected under the taxed 
Kiwi system, as all firms will be able to deduct the input VAT costs.  
6. Conclusion  
 
The exemption system used in the EU has been subject to much criticism, some of 
which is aimed specifically at the financial services exemptions (which includes the 
insurance exemption) as given that the exemption doesn’t raise particular equity 
concerns, ‘exempting such a large sector of an economy for practical reasons seems 
decidedly uncompelling as a policy choice and unsatisfactory as an administrative 
solution.’156 In addition to this, the EU’s decision to simply VAT-exempt the financial 
sector has been described as ‘fateful’157 as most other countries simply followed suit 
when introducing their own VATs, which proliferated the negative consequences onto a 
worldwide stage. New Zealand has, however, been branded the ‘innovator’158 by taxing 
non-life insurance under its GST, a decision that has been followed by other countries 
with more youthful VAT systems. This is in spite of many, including AG Jacobs, 
believing that insurance is ‘structurally unsuited’159 to subjection to turnover taxes.  
 
The approach taken by New Zealand has defied these opinions to some extent and 
achieved a system whereby insurance transactions are brought within the scope of GST. 
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As has been explained, this has been accomplished by way of a different mechanism for 
determining the value added. Insurance transactions may very well be ‘structurally 
unsuited’160 to the invoice-credit based VAT which applies on an individual transaction 
basis, however, New Zealand has managed to find a suitability to turnover taxes in its 
application of the business cash flow of an insurance company, which raises the 
determination of value added from the level of individual transactions to the insurance 
company itself.  
 
As it has been submitted that the harmful effects that arise as a result of the exemption 
are not in compliance with the character and nature of VAT, every effort should be 
made to reduce their application to improve the functioning of the VAT system and 
reduce market distortions that failures in the VAT system contribute to. The imperative 
question remains, therefore, as to whether the Kiwi system provides the solution to the 
problems that plague the EU system. It has been suggested by Cnossen that full taxation 
of this type on insurance transactions is ‘quite feasible, simpler and more efficient than 
the current system.’161 However, Chapter 5.1 of this thesis shows that this evaluation 
may overlook critical aspects relating to the application of the Kiwi system to the EU, 
especially in relation to its feasibility and simplicity. Thus far, those that have followed 
New Zealand’s example and learnt from ‘the EU VAT’s shortcomings’162 have been 
sovereign States acting individually and independently163, which is perhaps the greatest 
contrast to the potential application in the EU. Furthermore, the Kiwi style VAT has 
been introduced in countries with relatively less established VAT systems or at the point 
of enactment of a VAT regime, making transitional issues less troublesome and leaving 
a clear path for setting out the legal and practical ramifications of the taxed system. 
Although the application of the Kiwi system (and corresponding removal of the EU 
exemption) may prove feasible, there is likely to be a long and uphill struggle before the 
EU could reap the benefits of a taxed system, which must not be overlooked or 
underestimated.  
 
Although Cnossen proposes a direct transplantation of the New Zealand system to the 
EU164, De la Feria and Krever explain that for a transfer to succeed, it is necessary to 
look not only to the advantages of the modern VAT (such as the Kiwi GST), but also to 
its limitations.165 Aside from comparative and practical difficulties, the Kiwi system in 
itself contains shortcomings that need to be considered. By shifting the method of 
assessment to the level of the insurers, rather than the transactions, the overall result is 
correct in terms of the insurer’s cash flow, ‘but does not yield, however, the correct 
result at the level of the policyholders, if they are viewed individually and not as a 
group.’166 The problem of consumers who can’t claim input credit for premiums paid 
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European Taxation, Vol 3, Wolters Kluwer 2013) 3 at 34 
166 Tim Edgar, ‘The Search for Alternatives to the Exempt Treatment of Financial Services Under a Value 
Added Tax’ in Richard Krever and David White (eds), GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Thomson 
Brookers 2007) 50 
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arises again as under this system, if they do not receive an indemnity payment (risk 
doesn’t materialise) they remain taxed on the gross amount of the premium, but they do 
not ‘receive payouts that reverse the flow of premium payments’.167 This is in addition 
to the issue discussed previously whereby those who can’t claim input credit for the 
premiums end up bearing GST on the gross amount, rather than the value of the 
intermediation services rendered. A further problem that arises out of taxing insurance 
transactions is that, when other financial services remain exempt, new market 
distortions are likely to be created as insurance becomes comparatively over-taxed for 
consumers who can’t deduct input VAT and under-taxed for businesses, which is a 
reverse of the outcome under an exemption system.  
 
Furthermore, as was discussed in Chapter 5.2.4, regarding risk materialisation, the 
method used by NZ also creates compliance problems when cash payments are made to 
GST registered businesses. The requirement for GST registered businesses to account 
for GST on indemnity payments is administratively complex and unfamiliar to many 
insured parties, which is one of the reasons why, when introducing a VAT, Australia, 
after considering the NZ system, chose to apply a slightly different method, which 
instead places the compliance burden on the insurers.  
 
Accuracy has been sacrificed by the very nature of the Kiwi taxed system which has 
shifted the tax basis away from individual payments to an overall business cash flow, 
however, in simple terms of subjecting insurance to VAT, the New Zealand system has 
been successful. Although, like with all tax systems, some issues exist with the Kiwi 
system, when reaching a conclusion about the substitution of one system for another, 
these issues must be weighed against each other. Given the fundamental flaws with the 
exemption system and the market distortions it causes which have been evaluated, it is 
unsurprising that the Kiwi system looks more favourable. As it has been shown, it 
addresses the core failures of the exemption system, most notably, the existence of non-
deductible input VAT, definitional problems relating to the coverage of the exemption 
and intermediaries and lack of neutrality between different insured parties in relation to 
indemnity payments. For this reason, from a theoretical point of view, it would be 
advantageous for the EU to apply the Kiwi VAT system, as Cnossen proposes.168    
 
In the light of the EU not being able to resolve the problems of the exemption and the 
proposals for reform169, although having the potential to reduce the problems of the 
exemption to some extent, so far being unsuccessful in reaching agreement or 
implementation, it seems compelling to turn to other systems for inspiration and in this 
instance, New Zealand seems to provide a workable system. Given the potential for a 
fundamental change in the taxation of insurance in the EU, it is submitted that the Kiwi 
system should not be blindly followed, but that the EU should make every attempt to 
introduce the most practically and legally appropriate system available. In order to do 
so, the EU should learn from the weaknesses of the Kiwi system and find ways of 
resolving them, if possible. It has already been realised that ‘modern VATs are not a 
                                                 
167 Ibid 
168 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘A proposal to apply the Kiwi-VAT to insurance services in the European Union’ 
(2013) Int Tax Public Finance 20, 867  
169 COM/2007/747, supported by COM/2007/746 
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complete panacea’170, so this could be the EU’s opportunity to not only benefit from the 
advantages of the Kiwi system, but also from the negative aspects, in order to evolve a 
post-modern VAT in this area, which leads the way globally for the correct tax 
treatment of insurance transactions.  
                                                 
170 Rita de la Feria and Richard Krever, ‘Ending VAT Exemptions: Towards a Post-Modern VAT’, in 
Rita de la Feria, VAT Exemptions: Consequences and Design Alternatives (EUCOTAX Series on 
European Taxation, Vol 3, Wolters Kluwer 2013) 3 at 34 
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